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L A B O R L A W
Are Supervisory Law Enforcement
Officers Entitled to Overtime Under the
Fair Labor Standards Act?
by Jay E. Grenig
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(the "FLSA" or the "Act"), an
employer does not have to pay over-
time compensation to an employee
working in "a bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional
capacity." 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)
(1994). Such employees are paid on
a salaried, not hourly basis.
Regulations of the Department of
Labor ("DOL"), which administers
the FLSA, provide that an employee
is not salaried if the employee may
have deductions made from his or
her salary "because of variations in
the quality or quantity of the work
performed," 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)
(1954), although a one-time
deduction does not automatically
convert a salaried employee into a
nonsalaried, hourly employee
covered by the overtime provisions
of the Act. DOL regulations also
provide for a window of correction
that allows an employer to treat
employees as salaried, regardless of
the employer's one-time or uninten-
tional failure to adhere to the
requirements of Section 541.118(a).
This case is about whether police
sergeants who are subject to
short-term disciplinary suspensions
with an attendant loss of pay lose
their status as salaried employees
and, thus, become entitled to
overtime, either in the form of pay
or compensatory time. Complicating
the case is the fact that only one of
the 288 sergeants involved in this
case ever received a short-term
disciplinary suspension, and the
further fact, noted by the respon-
dents in their brief to the Supreme
Court, that a post-lawsuit DOL
regulation provides that a public-
sector employee does not lose his
or her status as a salaried employee
solely by virtue of being subject
to short-term suspensions
without pay.
(Continued on Page 158)
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FRANcIs BERNARD AUER ET AL. V
DAVID A. ROBBINS, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
ST. Louis BOARD OF
POLICE COMMISSIONERS, ET AL.
DOCKET No. 95-897
ARGUMENT DATE:
DECEMBER 10, 1996
FROM: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
ISSUES
1. Does the Eleventh Amendment
preclude private individuals from
bringing a federal lawsuit against a
state, or political subdivision of a
state, to enforce provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act?
2. Do employees lose their status as
salaried employees and become sub-
ject to the overtime provisions of
the Act because their pay is subject
to reduction under a written manual
that permits disciplinary suspen-
sions of less than one week?
FACTS
This case asks whether sergeants
and lieutenants in the St. Louis
police department are entitled to
overtime compensation under the
FLSA. According to a Missouri
statute, no St. Louis police officer
with the rank of sergeant or higher
is allowed overtime pay.
In 1988, 288 police sergeants
and one police lieutenant in the
St. Louis police department filed
suit against the St. Louis Board
of Police Commissioners (the
"Commissioners") in federal district
court, alleging that the department
had violated the FSLA by failing to
pay them overtime wage benefits. In
an unreported opinion, the district
court held that the lieutenant per-
formed primarily managerial duties
and, accordingly, was a salaried
employee. The court also ruled
that 20 categories of sergeants
were exempt from the Act's over-
time provisions and that two cate-
gories were partially exempt from
the provisions.
The sergeants appealed to the
Eighth Circuit which affirmed in
part and reversed in part, holding
that all categories of sergeants were
executive employees exempt from
the Act's overtime provisions.
65 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 1995). In a
portion of its decision that the
sergeants do not challenge, the
court of appeals held that all
sergeants performed primarily
administrative or managerial
duties, thereby satisfying the
"duties" component of the Act's
test for salaried status.
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the
sergeants' argument that they were
not salaried employees because they
could be disciplined by suspension
without pay for periods of less than
one week under the employer's dis-
ciplinary policy for violations of
minor rules, i.e., rules that do not
have a major impact on safety. The
court of appeals held that the mere
possibility of an improper pay
deduction does not defeat an
employee's status as salaried under
DOL regulations.
The Eighth Circuit went on to rule
that the sergeants were exempt
employees notwithstanding that in
one instance the department and
one sergeant had agreed to the
sergeant's two-day suspension
without pay for violating the depart-
ment's residency requirement.
Because a residency requirement is
not a safety rule of major signifi-
cance, the court concluded that the
sergeant's suspension without pay
was inconsistent with the DOL's
salary basis regulation and arguably
required that the sergeant be treat-
ed as a nonsalaried employee. The
court concluded, however, that such
a one-time improper deduction did
not mean that sergeants, as a cate-
gory, should be considered non-
salaried under the Act.
The Supreme Court granted the
sergeants' petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari to review the Eighth Circuit's
decision. 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
CASE ANALYSIS
As a general rule, the FLSA requires
employers to provide employees
with overtime compensation, either
overtime pay or compensatory time,
to employees for hours worked in
excess of a 40-hour work week.
When Congress passed amendments
to the FLSA in 1974 extending the
Act to state and municipal employ-
ers, it recognized the unusual
working conditions and long hours
of firefighters and law enforcement
employees. To alleviate the financial
burdens that result for public
employers, Congress enacted a
special overtime provision for
employees in those categories.
29 U.S.C. § 207(k). Instead of
requiring overtime compensation
after 40 hours of work in a seven-
day period for firefighters and law
enforcement employees, Congress
set a higher threshold for these
workers that is presently 171 hours
in a 28-day work period. The FLSA
also provides that an employer does
not have to pay overtime compensa-
tion to an employee who works in
"a bona fide executive, administra-
tive, or professional capacity."
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1994).
The FLSA delegates the
responsibility for defining these
terms to the Secretary of Labor.
29 U.S.C § 213(a)(1). Under DOL
regulations, an employee is not
salaried and, thus, is covered by the
Act's overtime provisions if the
employee is subject to salary deduc-
tions "because of variations in the
quality or quantity of the work per-
formed." 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).
However, DOL regulations provide
an exception to this rule. "Penalties
imposed in good faith for infractions
of safety rules of major significance
will not affect the employee's
salaried status." 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.118(a)(5).
Issue No. 3158
DOL regulations also provide that a
one-time deduction for a minor
work-rule infraction does not
automatically transform a salaried
employee into a nonsalaried one.
In this situation, DOL regulations
provide for a window of correction
and state that "the effect of making
a deduction which is not permitted
under these interpretations will
depend upon the facts in the
particular case." 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.118(a)(6). DOL regulations
further state that if "a deduction
not permitted by these interpreta-
tions is inadvertent, or is made for
reasons other than lack of work, the
exemption will not be considered to
have been lost if the employer
reimburses the employee for
such deductions and promises to
comply in the future." 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.118(a)(6). In other words,
the window of correction allows an
employer to treat otherwise eligible
employees as salaried employees,
regardless of the employer's one-
time or unintentional failure to
adhere to the requirements of
Section 541.118(a).
The sergeants argue that the FLSA's
goal of a broad national hours-of-
work standard presumes coverage of
all employees and is susceptible
only to very limited and narrowly
construed, exemptions. Contending
that the Supreme Court has conser-
vatively, consistently, and narrowly
construed efforts to expand exemp-
tions to the FLSA, the sergeants rely
on Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490,
493 (1945), in which the Supreme
Court ruled: "Any exemption from
such humanitarian and remedial
legislation must therefore be
narrowly construed, giving due
regard to the plain meaning of
statutory language and the intent of
Congress. To extend an exemption
to other than those plainly and
unmistakably within its terms and
spirit is to abuse the interpretative
process and to frustrate the
announced will of the people."
According to the sergeants, Congress
has expanded FLSA coverage over
the years but has been reluctant to
broaden exemptions from its
protections, such as the overtime
provisions at issue here. The
sergeants claim that the FLSA's test
for determining exempt executive
and administrative employees is rea-
sonable and an effective enforce-
ment component of the national
hours-of-work standard.
With respect to the DOL rule gener-
ally defining nonsalaried employees
as those who are subject to short-
term disciplinary suspensions with-
out pay, the sergeants argue that it is
a reasonable standard and a true
measure of nonsalaried status.
In the sergeants' view, it is clear that
employees subject to short-term loss
of pay for disciplinary reasons are
nonsalaried employees covered by
the Act's overtime provisions.
Such employees are distinguishable
from executive and administrative
employees who, when compared to
salaried employees, are more inde-
pendent, have greater control of
their work, and earn compensation
that is not conditioned on avoiding
discipline.
The sergeants next argue that the
department should not be able to
take advantage of the window of cor-
rection to avoid the overtime provi-
sions of the FSLA. They maintain
that the window of correction is
available solely to cure an impermis-
sible pay reduction made in cases of
actual mistake or inadvertence, and
is premised on restoring the lost
compensation and eliminating the
impermissible rule that led to the
pay reduction in the first place.
Because none of these preconditions
was met in this case, the sergeants
conclude that the department
should not be able to take advan-
tage of the corrective mechanism.
The Commissioners respond first
by advancing a procedural argu-
ment. Relying on Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996), 1 ABA PREVIEW 19 (Sept.
20, 1995), the Commissioners con-
tend that they are an arm of the
State of Missouri and, thus, are
immune from suit in federal court
under the Eleventh Amendment.
In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme
Court concluded that Congress'
authority under the Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3,
did not authorize it to enforce pro-
visions of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act by subjecting a
state to suit in federal court. In
other words, the Court held that
the Congress' Commerce Clause
authority, broad though it may be,
could not trump a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
The Commissioners agree that
Congress had Commerce Clause
authority to enact the FSLA. But
the Commissioners strenuously
argue that the Commerce Clause
does not permit private persons
such as the sergeants to sue an
arm of the state in federal court,
even if they are alleging a violation
of federal law.
The Commissioners' then advance
an argument on the merits in the
event they do not prevail on their
immunity argument. According to
the Commissioners, the DOL's reg-
ulations defining nonsalaried
employees as employees subject to
short-term loss of pay for discipli-
nary reasons are irrational as
applied to a public employer
engaged in law enforcement activi-
ty. They contend that as a law
enforcement agency, the St. Louis
police department must set a tone
of discipline and good order among
(Continued on Page 160)
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its officers. According to the
Commissioners, the department
needs the flexibility provided by
short-term disciplinary pay
reductions without being forced
to comply with the Act's overtime
provisions if it avails itself of that
disciplinary tool.
Even if the department is subject to
the DOL regulations defining
salaried and nonsalaried employees,
the Commissioners contend that the
department does not have a policy
or practice of short-term discipli-
nary pay reductions with respect to
its supervisory officers. They point
out that only one of the 288
sergeants involved in this case ever
received a short-term disciplinary
pay reduction and that the reduc-
tion occurred only after the depart-
ment and the sergeant negotiated a
two-day suspension with loss of pay
to settle the department's discipli-
nary charge that the officer violated
the department's residency policy.
According to the Commissioners,
this one-time, short-term suspen-
sion did not jeopardize the salaried
status of any other sergeant and
that the department is entitled to
correct the effects of the suspen-
sion, if it is determined that the
suspension was inconsistent with
the salaried status of supervisory
officers.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court's decision in
this case could be more important
for what it says about a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit by private persons in
federal court than what it may say
about the impact of short-term
disciplinary pay reductions on an
employee's status under the FSLA.
Several lower federal courts have
relied on the Court's Seminole Tribe
decision to hold that the FLSA does
not abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity, meaning
that any FSLA suit against a state or
arm of the state would have to be
brought in state court, if at all. See,
e.g., Adams v. Kansas, 919 F. Supp.
1496 (D. Kan. 1996); Mills v. Maine,
3 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 2d 767
(D. Me. 1996); Close v. State of New
York, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA)
2d 856 (N.D.N.Y 1996). Thus, this
case gives the Court the opportunity
to extend or restrict its Seminole
Tribe holding, and, if it extends the
Seminole Tribe holding, to further
shift the balance of authority
between the federal government
and the states in the states' favor.
With respect to the whether
short-term disciplinary pay reduc-
tions transform public salaried
employees to nonsalaried employ-
ees, a decision for the sergeants
would increase substantially the
wage-compensation costs of state
and local governments. In other
words, a decision for the sergeants
would cost state and local
taxpayers. A decision for the
Commissioners would remove one
incentive for public employers to
limit the hours exempt employees
are required to work.
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